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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between judicial independence and judicial
accountability by investigating the question of how selection methods shape state
appellate court decisions. I conducted a case study using the states of Tennessee and
Kentucky and the judicial selection methods of appointments and elections. I then
conducted a sample of cases and did a comparative quantitative analysis of reversal
records between the two states in the hopes of finding a statistical difference from my
research. The debate between judicial selection methods is not a simple question and this
thesis alone cannot provide the answer, but I hope that my research can provide useful
data for future research so that state policy makers can make a responsible decision and
resolve the conflict.

Keywords: Judicial Selection Methods, Appointments, Elections, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Case Study
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The judiciary branch has been rife with controversy since its beginning in 1776
when the founding fathers granted neither the power of the sword nor the power of the
purse to the third branch, but rather placed its fragile basis for power and authority in the
tumultuous hands of the public.1 Thus in modern times, the independence and
accountability of the judiciary directly affect the public confidence in the courts so
greatly that the “very existence of the rule of law is dependent on public confidence
because the public will not support institutions in which they have no confidence.”2 This
thesis explores the relationship between judicial independence and judicial accountability
by investigating the question of how selection methods shape state appellate court
decisions. The research is organized into three sections that address the relationships
between selection methods and judicial decision-making. The first section provides a
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses associated with judicial elections and the
judicial appointment process. The second section describes the historical evolution of the
judicial selection process in the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. The third section uses
quantitative analysis to compare appellate court decisions in Kentucky and Tennessee.

1

Frances Kahn Zemans, "The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence,"
Southern California Law Review (Southern California Law Review ), no. 75 (1999). 625.
2
Kelly J. Varsho, "In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Price for
Judicial Independence?," Northen Illinois University Law Review (Board of Regents, for
Northern Illinois University), no. 27 (Summer 2007): 455.
1

The conclusion of the paper reports the findings of the analysis and suggests how these
findings may affect the judicial selection process.

2

CHAPTER 2
CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Judicial elections in the US began with the rise of the Jacksonian democracy in
the early nineteenth century along with the rise of suspicion that aristocracy dominated
the bench.3 President Jackson notoriously referred to judges as “politicians who hide their
policies under their robes” and advocated greater accountability in the judiciary to the
public through elections.4 The same sentiment holds true today that the “virtues that
make a person a good judge are not usually the same virtues that make a good
politician.”5 However, in today’s society judges are often believed to be policy makers
and “like all policymakers in a democracy, …[justices] must retain their posts in order to
achieve their policy goals.”6 Through the electoral selection process justices are forced
into the increasingly politically charged atmosphere of campaigning; which one state

3

Bradley C. Canon, "Judicial Election and Appointment at the State Level: Commentary
on State Selection of Judges," Kentucky Law Journa (Kentucky College of Law ), no. 77
(1989): 748.
4
Kelly J. Varsho, "In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Price for
Judicial Independence?," Northen Illinois University Law Review (Board of Regents, for
Northern Illinois University), no. 27 (Summer 2007): 449
5
Marie A. Failinger, "Can a Good Judge Be a Good Politician? Judicial Elections from a
Virtue Ethics Approach," Missouri Law Review (Curators of the University of Missouri),
Spring 2005. 435
6
Neal Devins and Nicole Mansker, "The Judiciary and The Popular Will: Public Opinion
and State Supreme Courts," University of Pennsylvania of Constitutional Law (University
of Pennsylvania Constitutional Law ) 13 (December 2010). 470.
3

Supreme Court justice once described as having “never felt so much like a hooker down
by the bus station in any race [than he] did in a judicial race.”7
In this critique of the judicial selection process of elections there are three main
points of dissent: campaigns, improper influences on judicial conduct, and judicial
accountability.
Election campaigns have become “nastier, noisier, and costlier” resulting in a
judiciary dependent upon the public and strained by the “sword of popular opinion
hanging over their necks…” Judiciaries have become subject to highly politicized and
expensive campaigns, heightened scrutiny, and an unpredictable public.8 The nature of
elections and campaigns has blurred the very line that separates the judiciary from
political actors, which is that judges are not representatives; they do not serve any
constituency or aim to advance the interests of any particular community. Furthermore,
judges are intended to be insulated from outside influences such as political action groups
and campaign money, while political actors are rewarded for advancing particular
interests through their work and let public opinion dictate their decisions.9 Former
California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus described the pressures that come with
judicial campaigning as similar to “finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to
7

Neal Devins and Nicole Mansker, "The Judiciary and The Popular Will: Public Opinion
and State Supreme Courts," University of Pennsylvania of Constitutional Law (University
of Pennsylvania Constitutional Law ) 13 (December 2010). 490.
8
Kelly J. Varsho, "In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Price for
Judicial Independence?," Northen Illinois University Law Review (Board of Regents, for
Northern Illinois University), no. 27 (Summer 2007): 445.
9
Kelly J. Varsho, "In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Price for
Judicial Independence?," Northen Illinois University Law Review (Board of Regents, for
Northern Illinois University), no. 27 (Summer 2007): 456.
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shave in the morning. You know it’s there, and you try not to think about it, but it’s hard
to think about much else.”10
Judicial campaigns have grown so ugly that both the public and the judiciary
branch believe those with money can buy justice.11 The notion that there is a “price tag
put on a seat behind the bench” is only strengthened by the alarming rate at which
campaigns and campaign contributions have grown over the past two decades, in some
cases even up to a 320% increase.12 Even the most decent and honest judicial candidates
have been turned into “junkies…caught in the political equivalent of an arms race in
which neither side feels safe to disarm unilaterally because each candidate lives in mortal
fear” that they need the contributions to ensure an electoral victory.13
USA Today and Gallup found through polling that 89 percent of those surveyed
believed the influence of campaign contributions on judges’ rulings is a problem, and that
90 percent felt judges should be removed from a case if it involves a contributor.14 A
survey of Texas judges stated that 48 percent confessed that they believed money had an
10

Deborah Goldberg, "Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of Judges and the
Rules of Campaign Finance," Ohio State Law Journal (Ohio State Law Journal) 64
(2003). 98
11
Kelly J. Varsho, "In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Price for
Judicial Independence?," Northen Illinois University Law Review (Board of Regents, for
Northern Illinois University), no. 27 (Summer 2007): 472
12
Jason Miles Levien and Stacie L. Fatka, "Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining
the First Amendment Limitations On Judicial Campaign Regulation," Michigan Law &
Policy Review (University of Michigan Law School) 2 (1997). 76
13
James Sample, "Democracy At The Corner of First And Fourtheenth: Judicial
Campaign Spending And Equalityy," New York University Annual Survey of American
Law (New York University Annual Survey of American Law ) 66 (2011). 736
14
Buck Lewis, "It's a Mighty Short Drive from the Harman Mine to the Tennessee Line,"
Tennessee Bar Journal (Tennessee Bar Journal Association, Inc), April 2009. 3
5

impact on judicial elections.15 Another study found that Ohio justices routinely sat on
cases after having received campaign contributions from the parties involved, and that
they then voted in favor of those contributors 70 percent of the time; one justice voted in
favor of his contributors 91 percent of the time.16
Avery v. State Farm heard in the Illinois Supreme Court in 2003 is a prime
example of pending high-stakes litigation and big-money campaigns. The case, which
had over 1 billion dollars at stake, was pending its appeal during the judicial elections.
The combined campaigns of the two candidates running for the open seat in a rural single
district exceeded 9.3 million dollars, which was close to double the previous national
record for state judicial elections. The victorious candidate had been supported by
350,000 dollars through direct contributions of various persons involved with State Farm
and its pending appeal, in addition to one million dollars from larger groups that State
Farm was affiliated with. The judge almost immediately upon taking the bench then cast
a tie-breaking vote “nixing” the 456 million dollar claim against State Farm. “The
juxtaposition of gigantic campaign contributions and favorable judgments for
contributors creates a haze of suspicion over the highest court in Illinois…although [the
justice] [was] an intelligent and no doubt honest man, the manner of his election will cast

15

Mark A. Behrens and Cary Silverman, "The Case For Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems For State Court Judges," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
(Cornell University ) 11 (Spring 2002). 283
16
James Sample, "Democracy At The Corner of First And Fourtheenth: Judicial
Campaign Spending And Equalityy," New York University Annual Survey of American
Law (New York University Annual Survey of American Law ) 66 (2011). 750
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doubt over every vote he casts.”17 Perception in this instance is as important as reality; if
voters believe that donors call the shots, they will be less willing to take part in
democratic governance, and confidence in the judicial system will be eroded.18
The “unavoidable truth” is that the most frequent contributors to judicial
campaigns are lawyers; law firms; and entities like businesses, unions, and special
interest groups that are likely to appear in court before judges they helped to elect.19
Lawyers in particular have stood out as one of the biggest group of contributors to
campaigns because of the inevitable pressure that their success and livelihood depends on
their ability to gain favorable rulings.20 However, this should not prove surprising
because it is only logical that those who have the most at stake and the most to lose
would take a greater interest than those who have no personal or professional investment
on the line.
There are many arguments against judicial elections, but there are many ardent
supporters who feel elections are the most democratic and fair selection method. No

17

James Sample, "Democracy At The Corner of First And Fourtheenth: Judicial
Campaign Spending And Equalityy," New York University Annual Survey of American
Law (New York University Annual Survey of American Law ) 66 (2011). 754
18
Shirley S. Abrahamson, "Speech: The Ballot and The Bench," New York University
Law Review (New York University Law Review ) 76 (October 2001). 995
19
Shira J. Goodman, Lynn A. Marks and David Caroline, "What's More Important:
Electing Judges or Judicial Indepence? It's time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial
Independence," Duquesne Law Review (Duquesne University) 48 (Fall 2010). 864
20
Jason Miles Levien and Stacie L. Fatka, "Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining
the First Amendment Limitations On Judicial Campaign Regulation," Michigan Law &
Policy Review (University of Michigan Law School) 2 (1997). 77
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system is without its flaws or room for improvement as seen with the equally adamant
arguments for and against appointment methods.

CHAPTER 3
CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
The judicial appointment system that will be analyzed in this thesis is that of merit
selection, also known as the “Missouri Plan”. This system arose from the rising
skepticism of reformers in the 1940’s that voters could not distinguish “able judicial
candidates from mediocre ones.”21 This skepticism was due in part to the political
machines that were dominating the local selection of judges, which Roscoe Pound
criticized in his address, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice; of “putting courts into politics,… compelling judges to become politicians,
[and] …almost destroy[ing] the traditional respect for the bench.”22 The original merit
selection plan was then designed by Albert Kanes as a means to “alleviate the problems
afflicting the courts” and was endorsed by the American Judicature and the American Bar
Association and first instituted in Missouri in 1940.23 Merit selection plans now differ

21

Bradley C. Canon, "Judicial Election and Appointment at the State Level: Commentary
on State Selection of Judges," Kentucky Law Journa (Kentucky College of Law ), no. 77
(1989): 749
22
John D. Fabian, "The Paradox of Elected Judges: Tension in the American Judicial
System," Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) 15
(Fall 2001). 166.
23
G. Alan Tarr, "Retention Elections in a Merit-Selection System: Balancing the Will of
the Public with the Need for Judicial Independence and Accountability: Do Retention
8

according to different states but the general construct is comprised of three main parts.
The first component is a nonpolitical nominating commission that selects judicial
candidates based on their competency for office. Second, an appointing authority, such as
a chief justice or governor, chooses one of the candidates from the submitted list and
appoints the person to the judicial vacancy. The final step in the merit selection process
occurs often many months even up to two years after the initial appointment, when the
newly appointed judge must run in a noncompetitive, nonpartisan retention election after
serving the aforementioned set term on the bench.24
The primary criticism of the merit selection method is that it “moves politics to
the backroom” and deprives the public of their fundamental right to vote and select
judges as they do other political leaders.25 Not only do judicial appointments restrict
voter’s rights, but they also restrict candidates who could seek a position on an appellate
court to the few selected by the judicial nominating commission.26 For both of these

Elections Work?," Missouri Law Review (Curators of the University of Missouri) 74
(Summer 2009). 609.
24
James J. Alfini and Jarrett Gable, "The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial
Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards," Dickinson Law Review (Dickinson School
of Law ), no. 106 (Spring 2002). 690
25
Sr. Judge Peter Paul Olszewski, "Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are
Preferable to Merit Selection Systems," Penn State Law Review (Dickinson School of
Law) 109 (Summer 2004). 2
26
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 473.
9

reasons judicial appointments are criticized for being undemocratic and often seen as “a
masquerade to put political power in the hands… of the elite.”27
Judicial appointments are also considered a threat to judicial independence and
accountability but for different reasons that judicial elections. Appointed judges are
accused of responding far less to the will of the public and more to the will of the
governor or legislature that appointed them, giving them the perception of being elitist
and too isolated from public opinion.28 Such as when California Governor Gray Davis
flat out stated in response to questions regarding his recent judicial appointments that he
expected his judicial appointees “to more or less reflect [his] views…expressed during
his own election campaign or resign.”29
Although advocates of merit selection appointments argue that it is a less political
process, critics disagree claiming that politics actually play a large role in the selection of
committee members as well as the commission’s deliberation process.30 Commissions are
also accused of using unfair tactics to choose candidates such as “panel stacking” when a
nominating commission’s list of nominees is fixed so that there is no real choice for the
27

G. Alan Tarr, "Retention Elections in a Merit-Selection System: Balancing the Will of
the Public with the Need for Judicial Independence and Accountability: Do Retention
Elections Work?," Missouri Law Review (Curators of the University of Missouri) 74
(Summer 2009). 610.
28
Neal Devins and Nicole Mansker, "The Judiciary and The Popular Will: Public
Opinion and State Supreme Courts," University of Pennsylvania of Constitutional Law
(University of Pennsylvania Constitutional Law ) 13 (December 2010). 483
29
Shirley S. Abrahamson, "Speech: The Ballot and The Bench," New York University
Law Review (New York University Law Review ) 76 (October 2001). 988.
30
Sr. Judge Peter Paul Olszewski, "Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are
Preferable to Merit Selection Systems," Penn State Law Review (Dickinson School of
Law) 109 (Summer 2004). 9
10

appointing authority to make, and “logrolling” when individual commission members cut
deals with other commission members to support their respective nominees.31
There are pros and cons to each side of the judicial selection battle that is raging
within state governments. However, the longer it continues the more controversy will
arise and further weaken the public’s trust in the judiciary branch. The aforementioned
controversies that arise from elections as well as appointments chip away at the
judiciary’s most valuable asset of its independence. Some argue that judicial
independence can be divided into two separate concepts of decisional and institutional
independence; decisional independence is a judge’s ability to decide cases free from
improper influences, based solely on the law and applicable facts whereas institutional
independence is insularity from the other political branches of government and therefore
being free to decide cases without fear of retribution from the executive or legislative
branches.32
It has become so deeply embedded in the “American psyche… that judicial
independence [is]…the backbone of the American democracy, the bulwark of the
Constitution, and an indispensable element of our constitutional framework.”33 However,
the public, as well as, members of the judiciary feel that this promise of candor and
31

Sr. Judge Peter Paul Olszewski, "Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are
Preferable to Merit Selection Systems," Penn State Law Review (Dickinson School of
Law) 109 (Summer 2004). 9
32
Kelly J. Varsho, "In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Price for
Judicial Independence?," Northen Illinois University Law Review (Board of Regents, for
Northern Illinois University), no. 27 (Summer 2007): 450
33
John D. Fabian, "The Paradox of Elected Judges: Tension in the American Judicial
System," Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) 15
(Fall 2001). 155.
11

justice is not being met, and that the root of the controversy surrounding the integrity and
quality of judiciary members stems from a common source of malcontent: judicial
selection methods.
Both elections and appointments create cause for concern in the eyes of the public
as judicial independence and accountability is called into question regarding different
aspects of both selection processes. Whichever way it is cut, judicial independence is
vital to the court’s stability as an institution and cannot afford to be compromised; which
is why the sooner the debate over selection methods is resolved the sooner confidence
and stability in the courts will return. However, there is much to learn from the history of
the judicial branch and judicial selection methods of both Tennessee and Kentucky. Both
states have their reasons for their current selection method based on their own unique
histories that is a strong argument when considering such a large potential policy shift.

12

CHAPTER 4
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL BRANCH AND JUDICIAL SELECTION IN TENNESSE
The first Tennessee constitution, ratified in 1796 when Tennessee became the
nation's sixteenth state, granted judges life tenure “so long as they exhibited ‘good
behavior’ and placed the power to select those judges exclusively in the hands of the state
legislature.”34 Tides changed in the nineteenth century when Tennessee’s very own
Andrew Jackson spearheaded the populist movement for democracy the will of the
common man to be heard equally as loud as the socially and politically elite.35 When
Tennessee first tried to adopt selection of judges at its second Constitutional Convention
in 1834 however, the proposal failed and was not approved as a constitutional
amendment until nineteen years later under the condition that judges would “be elected
by the qualified voters” to limited terms of eight years.36 The next change in judicial
selection methods would not come until over one hundred years later in 1971 with the
appointment based merit selection plan aptly referred to as “The Tennessee Plan.”37

34

Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 477.
35
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 477.
36
IBID
37
IBID
13

The initiative in Tennessee for a change in the judicial selection process came
largely from professional lawyer organizations that wanted to remove the politics from
process of elections because for much of the post-Civil War era, Tennessee was a oneparty state; thus, whichever candidate was nominated by the Democratic Party was all but
certain to win a judgeship.38 The election system in place was hardly democratic because
most judges in Tennessee were elevated to the bench after 1853 not by election, but by
gubernatorial appointment to fill interim vacancies; so much so that 60 percent of justices
who had served on the Tennessee Supreme Court during the first 100 years of elections
were appointed by the governor.39
The Plan in 1971 originally called for all "vacancies" on the intermediate
appellate courts and Supreme Court to be filled by the governor.40 However, The Plan
described "vacancies" not only as interim vacancies, i.e.,. instances where a judge left in
the middle of an eight-year term, but also as instances where the judge completed an
eight-year term and did not run for reelection; which essentially required the governor to
initially appoint all judges on the intermediate appellate courts and the supreme court.41
The Plan remains intact today, but a few key revisions were made such as in
1974, when the legislature amended the Plan to revoke its applicability to vacancies on
38

IBID, 473.
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 473.
40
Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-712 (1972)
41
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 473.
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39

the Supreme Court.42 Not until 20 years later would the legislature add the court back on
in 1994, creating a large window when elections were still held for judges.43
The legislature has also adjusted the nominating commission that supplies the list
of names from which the governor must appoint judges.44 Although legislators no longer
serve on the commission, the two speakers of the legislature select all seventeen
members. Fourteen members must be lawyers, leaving only three non-lawyers. Twelve of
the fourteen lawyer members must come from names supplied by five special lawyers'
organizations. Two members must be taken from names submitted by the Tennessee Bar
Association, one from the Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association, three from the
Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, three from the Tennessee District Attorneys
General Conference, and three from the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers. The two remaining lawyer members need not be taken from one of these
groups.45
Tennessee still uses its unique merit selection appointment system, as its judicial
selection process, which was reaffirmed in 2009, so therefore will continue to be used.
The current Tennessee judiciary is composed of three appellate courts--the supreme
court, court of appeals, and court of criminal appeals; four trial courts of general
42

1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 433, § 1
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 473.
44
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, "Essay: Election As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered ," Tennessee Law Review (Tennessee Law Review Association, Inc), no.
75 (Spring 2008): 473.
45
IBID
15
43

jurisdiction--the chancery court, circuit court, probate court, and criminal court; and three
courts of limited jurisdiction--the juvenile court, general sessions court, and municipal
court.46

46

Judicial Selection of States: Tennessee, 2011,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=TN.
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CHAPTER 5
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL BRANCH AND JUDICIAL SELECTION IN KENTUCKY
The first constitution of Kentucky commenced on June 1, 1792 and followed the
federal example to make no attempt to rigidly dictate a certain format, but rather
empowered the legislature to outline the detailed pattern of organizational structure, to
determine the necessary number and proper allocation of judges, and to define and alter
the jurisdiction of the courts.47 After the US Supreme Court established judicial review in
the case of Marbury v. Madison however, many Kentuckians were unsure of whether it
was sound doctrine and grew resentful of the courts; particularly the state legislature who
“denounced the judges as usurpers, tyrants, and kings.”48
The conflict came to a head in 1824 when the legislature passed an act entitled
“An Act to Reorganize the Court of Appeals”, the measure was signed off by the
governor and ineffectively attempted to abolish the constitutional “old court” with a
legislative “new court.”49 Strangely, both courts held sessions with come circuit judges
“recognizing the one and some as the other true court, while several alternately

47

William E. Bivin, "Historical Development of the Kentucky Courts ," Kentucky Law
Journal, no. 47 (1959): 467.
48
IBID 478.
49
IBID 478.
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recognized both.”50 The matter was finally resolved with the public at the 1850
constitutional convention where the third constitution resulted in an extreme measure of
almost all public offices being elected, after 50 years of the Governor holding the power
to appoint most public officials for lifetime tenure.51
At this time public opinion strongly believed that “ultimate sovereign [were] the
freemen of the State at the polls” and this belief has been stood firm throughout the years
with the Kentucky judicial selection system as a testament to that belief, as it has not
changed significantly since the 1850 constitutional convention.52 The only other
significant change occurred in 1976 with a revision of the judicial article that created a
unified court system known as the court of justice and established nonpartisan elections
for judges.53
The current Kentucky judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, court of appeals,
circuit court, and district court. Judges of the Supreme Court, court of appeals, and circuit
court are elected to eight-year terms, and district court judges are elected to four-year
terms, but if a mid-term judicial vacancy occurs, the governor appoints a replacement
from a list submitted by a judicial nominating commission.54

50

William E. Bivin, "Historical Development of the Kentucky Courts ," Kentucky Law
Journal, no. 47 (1959): 479.
51
IBID 483.
52
"Sketch of the Court of Appeals," in History of Kentucky (Genealogical Publishing
Company, 1998). Pg 498.
53
Judicial Selection in the States: Kentucky, 2011,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=KY.
54
Judicial Selection in the States: Kentucky, 2011,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=KY.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYTICAL REASONING FOR RESEARCH
The purpose of my research on this issue is to the answer the question “Is the
quality and independence of a state’s judiciary affected by the manor of a judicial
selection?” This is an important question because when answered it will have significant
implications for not only Tennessee and Kentucky but for other states in similar
situations. The national average for state reversal rates is 32 percent, which creates a
benchmark for this case study.55 If a state has a reversal rate significantly higher than the
national average than that would “imply high trial court error rates…[and] troublingly
high rates of appellate court and trial court disagreement”, as well as incorrect rulings by
sitting judges.56 If a state has a reversal rate significantly lower it would imply greater
consistency within the court system as well as high rates of more sound rulings.
State legislators, social and political leaders as well as voters are looking for
answers to this question. Not necessarily specifically between Kentucky and Tennessee,
but for what that would mean for their states and their counties when elections or
appointments roll around. By determining either a similarity or dissimilarity another
small piece will fall into place. Do appeal records reveal quality of judicial decisions and
55

Theodore Eisenberg and Michael Heise, "Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal," Cornell Law Faculty Publications (January 1,
2009). Pg 137.
56
Theodore Eisenberg and Michael Heise, "Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal," Cornell Law Faculty Publications (January 1,
2009). Pg 138.
19

thereby the quality of persons and as an even further extension quality of judicial
selection processes? That is why I have chosen this research question, because regardless
of the outcome of the data analysis the question will be answered and provide useful
results to others who are conducting their own research or making decisions for their
community and country.
I became personally interested in this topic a few years ago when I took a course
on the judicial process and learned about the intricacies within the federal judicial system.
However, I thought it was interesting that all federal judges are selected by appointment
while state judges have such variety in their different judicial selection methods. I
especially became interested in Tennessee and Kentucky because they are so similar
regarding their population size, geographical location, and because I have personally
experienced the political atmosphere from living in both states.
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CHAPTER 7
METHODS
In this study, I compare affirmed and reversal records for appellate court
decisions in the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. These two states prove to be good
cases for comparison because they have similar population sizes and are located in
similar geographic regions and they share social, cultural and economic conditions.
Where they differ substantially is in the selection methods for judges: Kentucky selects
judges through elections and Tennessee selects through appointments. By analyzing
reversal and affirmation rates from systems that select judges differently, the analysis
hopes to identify the advantages and disadvantages of the two.
Originally I had planned on comparing the records of every case for the past ten
years in both states, but after much searching I finally came to the conclusion that such a
record does not exist. Neither the courts in Kentucky nor in Tennessee keep track of their
reversal records. I was also surprised to find that Kentucky did not even have its own
research department to keep track of any other kinds of data over the years. Tennessee
had a small research department but their records were minimal and they only started
keeping electronic records within the past 10 years.
The Kentucky Supreme Court office sends all their records out to an independent
organization called the National Center for State Courts. This group “is an independent,
nonprofit court improvement organization founded at the urging of Chief Justice of the
21

Supreme Court Warren E. Burger. He envisioned NCSC as a clearinghouse for research
information and comparative data to support improvement in judicial administration in
state courts.”57 It was from a senior analyst at this group that I was informed that the only
way to obtain the records of reversed and overturned cases was to read each case
individually and retrieve my own data. Neither state court system could provide me with
the raw data, so once again I turned to the National Center for State Courts who then sent
me their data regarding how many cases were filed and heard in each state. The records I
was provided with stopped after the year 2007 so my research is based off of cases
between 2000 and 2007 covering a seven-year time period.
The number of cases heard over so many years was substantial (5,746,381),
therefore I decided the most practical and efficient way to cover the data would be
through a random sampling of the court cases. A power analysis was performed using G
Power 3 to determine the most appropriate sample size for my study, resulting in a
suggested sample size of about 314 cases. I ended up sampling 400 cases: 200 from
Tennessee and 200 from Kentucky. The cases were randomly selected through the
LexisNexis database. The results were selected from civil and criminal cases in Tennessee
and Kentucky cases from the years 2000 through 2007. I did not include cases in my
sample that were regarding lawyers being debarred and only included cases that fell into
the civil or criminal category.
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National Center for State Courts , http://www.ncsc.org/About-us.aspx (accessed
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In my results I included the year of a case, the court in which it was last heard,
whether it was a civil or criminal case and then for simplicity the overall outcomes were
reported as either affirmed or not affirmed; however, only appellate decisions that
affirmed the trial court decision in whole are considered “affirmed” and all other
outcomes, such as reversed in part/affirmed in part, reversed in whole, modified, and
remanded, are labeled “not affirmed.” I decided these variables were the most important
to record because they all provide key information, which can help explain the outcome
of a decision.
After compiling my raw data I then created a pivot table in which I separated the
data in to three groups for Tennessee and Kentucky, criminal and civil, and affirmed and
not affirmed. From the data in the pivot table I then performed a chi-squared test.
Pivot table 1.

Figure 1.1
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CHAPTER 8
RESULTS

Figure 2.1

Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.3
The results from the pivot table show a noticeable difference between the number
of not affirmed cases and affirmed cases in Kentucky and Tennessee. There is an even
greater difference between civil cases specifically between the two states when looking at
the raw data, where Tennessee has considerably fewer not affirmed cases than Kentucky.
The results from my chi-squared goodness of fit test further showed the difference
between observed and expected scores is at the .01 level (.00248) thus demonstrating a
significant difference between the scores of Kentucky and Tennessee. I then compared
Kentucky and Tennessee separately to the expected national average of state reversal
rates of 32 percent. Kentucky’s score of .54428 was not statistically significant and was
similar to the national average. Tennessee’s results were very significant and scored
above the .001 level (.00004216).
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This data therefore suggests that Tennessee is not only significantly different from
Kentucky, but that it is also very significantly different from the national average of state
reversal rates in that it has significantly fewer reversed cases.

26

CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
What is the reason for this discrepancy between Tennessee and its neighboring
state and even all other states in the country? Based on my research and the literature, I
think there is a strong case for the argument that Tennessee has a judicial selection
system that results in higher quality judges and therefore leads to lower reversal rates and
more efficient court system overall. Through my research I read the pros and cons of each
side of the argument between Kentucky and Tennessee selection methods and
overwhelmingly the electoral process had not only more possibility for error, but also
more concrete evidence of error as well as pure abuse of the system. The Tennessee plan
has a check for its system against cooking the books in its retention elections that allow
the public to decide if a judge stays or goes usually after only two years into their term.
My data analysis confirms these perceptions with a significant amount of concrete
evidence.
What does this mean in the larger scheme of the debate that is raging across the
country? It means that this isolated study provided data that can be built upon to expand
the effects and results of judicial appointments and elections. As it stands now, I think
this should draw the attention of Kentuckians to consider making some changes in their
system. I think if Kentucky decided to switch from elections to an appointment system,
similar to Tennessee’s merit plan form, it would be likely they would see a positive
27

change in their court system. I would expect them to find more fair rulings the first time
their case was heard, more qualified judges themselves, and overall a greater respect for
the judicial branch. Respect and trust in the judiciary would be the most important
outcome, for as stated previously the “American psyche… that judicial independence
[is]…the backbone of the American democracy, the bulwark of the Constitution, and an
indispensable element of our constitutional framework.”58
If other states ran comparisons with their records against the national average for
reversals than I think it would be beneficial to see where what states and where what
methods of judicial selection fell. I also think major progress could be made at the state
level if records were more closely examined. I was shocked that the court systems didn’t
keep their own data more logically recorded. When I called various branches on the state
courts they would pass me on to the other court or to a different office either simply to
evade the question or because they all genuinely thought some else had the data, when in
reality it wasn’t there.
An outside source sorts through judicial information where it is available but
underutilized and for that I think the judicial system has paid a high price. The topic of
judicial selection methods is one of importance and relevance to the whole judicial
system because it is at the beginning. Every state judge must pay through some test
whether it be through an election or an appointment or both to receive and maintain their
position; wouldn’t we want the most rigorous and efficient system possible so as to
58
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receive the best candidates for the job? Just because a person was popularly voted into
office does not mean they are qualified for the job. My data analysis supports this
conclusion because between Tennessee, which requires more credentials and more
checks and balances, and Kentucky, which has almost no credential requirements and
very limited checks and balances, there is such a significant statistical difference that I
believe suggests Tennessee has the superior results and therefore superior court system
which all begins with the judicial selection process because a court can only be as strong
as the judges on its bench.
However, if further research were to be conducted there could potentially be many
factors that could explain the difference in reversal rates between the states. Kentucky
could have suffered from a scandal in the executive branch that would make voters
uncomfortable with appointments, or because of the way the counties are broken up in
one state versus the other it might lend itself more towards elections. This is just one
study and for any decision to made responsibly as many factors as possible must be
considered when making it. The data is strong, but follow up research and other case
studies will make the final case for one method over the other considerably more
compelling.
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Civil Cases Filed59
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

KY

267,300

269,003

282,578

220,102

217,090

221,084

269,003

249,467

1,952,284

TN

134,666

157,210

155,577

69,589

77,138

76,028

72,881

70,159

813,248

Criminal Cases Filed

KY

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

234,573

206,910

194,044

251,508

271,902

254,939

249,685

251,482

1,915,042

59

Melissa T. Cantrell, Carol R. Flango and Karen Gillions Way, State Court Caseload
Statistics 2001, Conference of State Court Administrators, the State Justice Institute, the
Buerau of Justice Statistics, National Center for State Courts' Court Statistics Project
(National Center for State Courts , 2001).
Shauna M. Strickland and Brenda G. Otto, State Court Caseload Statistics 2002 ,
Conference of State Court administrators, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nationa Center
for State Courts' Court Statistic Project (National Center for State Courts , 2003).
Shuana M. Strickland, State Court Caseload Statistics 2003, Conference of State Court
Administrators, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Center for State Courts' Court
Statistics Project (National Center for States Courts , 2004).
Shuana M. Stickland, State Court Caseload Statistics 2004, Conference of State Court
Administrators, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Center for State Courts' Court
Statistics Project (National Center for State Courts, 2005).
Shuana M. Stickland, Chantal M. Bromage and William E. Raftery, State Court
Caseload Statistics 2006, Conference of State Court Administrators, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, National Center for State Courts' Court Statistics Project (National Center for
State Courts , 2007). Shuana M. Strickland, Chantal G. Bromage, Sarah A. Gibson,
Ashley N. Mason and William E. Raftery, State Court Caseload Statistics: An Analysis
of 2007 State Caseloads , Conference of State Court Administrators, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, National Center for State Courts' Court Statistics Project (National Center for
State Courts , 2009).
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TN

96,744

98,521

87,754

119,773

162,501

158,044

171,571

170,899

Figure 3.1
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